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I.
COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES
All parties to this proceeding are identified in the caption. The appellant, Trent
Tucker, was the defendant in a District Court criminal action brought by appellee, the State
of Utah.
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IV.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22 (Supp. 2002), whereby the defendant in a district court criminal action may take an appeal
to the Supreme Courtfromafinaljudgment of conviction for afirstdegree or capital felony.
Appellant was convicted of murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-203 (2001).
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V.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE A
WHETHER THE MEDICAL EXAMINER'S TESTIMONY THAT THE MANNER
OF DEATH WAS "HOMICIDE" BY "DELIBERATE ACT" WAS AN IMPROPER
COMMENT THAT USURPED THE JURY'S FUNCTION TO DETERMINE,
INTENT IN VIOLATION OF RULE 704 OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In general, a trial court is granted broad discretion in its decision lo admit 01 exclude
evidence State\ Pena 86C>1' "M9P 'USi hlil'WJi

loviici |iieslion ih\klli i Ih uiicct

rule of evidence was selected, w hether a rule w as correctly applied, and whether a rule was correctly
iiilnpieledarc In .il i|uestionsrequiringcorrectton-oi-enoi slandardof ieview Statev Horton. 848
P.2d 708, 713 (Utah App 1993)
ISSUE B
WHETHER THE MEDICAL EXAMINER'S TESTIMONY THAT THE MANNER
OF DEATH WAS "HOMICIDE" BY "DELIBERATE ACT" WAS IMPROPERLY
BASED ON INADMISSTBLF HEARSAY EVIDENCE.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Same as Issue A above
ISSUE I
WHETHER THE TRIALCOURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW COUNSEL *OR DEFENDANI
TO CROSS EXAMINE THE MEDICAL EXAMINER ABOUT WHETHER HIS OPINION
THAT A "HOMICIDE" WAS COMMITTED BY "DELIBERATE \CT FVC I I DKD
NEGLIGENT ACTS AND VIOLATED DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS IO CONFRONT
WITNESSES AND PRESENT \ DEFENSF

2

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Although the trial court has discretion in limiting cross-examination, wide latitude is
allowed for examining on matters affecting credibility; the appellate court will set aside a
verdict if the erroneously excluded evidence would probably have had a substantial influence
in bringing about a different verdict. State v. Rammel. 721 P.2d 498,499-500 (Utah 1986).
The violation of a defendant's constitutional right, such as refusal to allow cross-examination
requires a reversal for new trial unless the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Chavez. 41 P.3d 1137 (Utah App. 2002).
ISSUE D
WHETHER THE DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE PRESENT
DURING THE RULING ON A QUESTION BY THE JURY DURING
DELIBERATIONS WAS VIOLATED WHEN THE COURT ANSWERED A
QUESTION BY THE JURY WITHOUT THE DEFENDANT'S PRESENCE
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court's application and interpretation of constitutional provisions is reviewed
under a correction-of-error standard. State v. Humphrey. 823 P.2d 464,465-66 (Utah 1991).
The violation of a defendant's constitutional right requires reversal for a new trial unless the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Chavez. 41 P.3d 1137 (Utah App.
2002).
ISSUE E
WHETHER IT WAS PLAIN ERROR FOR THE COURT TO GIVE INSTRUCTION
NUMBER 19, WHICH ERRONEOUSLY STATES THE CffiCUMSTANCES UNDER
WHICH A JURY MAY CONSIDER A LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE
3

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether a jury instruction correctly states the law is a conclusion of law reviewed for
correctness. State v. Archuleta. 850 P.2d 1232, 1244 (Utah 1993).
ISSUE F
WHETHER THE PROSECUTOR IMPROPERLY ELICITED INADMISSIBLE
EXPERT EVIDENCE ABOUT THE LACK OF BURN MARKS ON THE HANDS OF
THE DECEASED
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Prosecutorial misconduct merits reversal when it calls to juror's attention matters they
would not be justified in considering in reaching a verdict and the appellate court believes
that the jurors were probably influenced by the remarks. State v. Creviston. 646 P.2d 750,
754 (Utah 1982).
ISSUE G
WHETHER "CURATIVE INSTRUCTIONS" GIVEN BY THE TRIAL JUDGE WAS
ADEQUATE TO AMELIORATE THE CONTINUED PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The general rule regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence is that the trial
court's decision will not be overturned in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Ostler v.
Albina Transfer Co.. Inc.. 781 P.2d 445,447 (Utah App. 1989) citing Pearce v. Wistisen. 701
P.2d489,491 (Utah 1985).
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ISSUE H
WHETHER THE NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE THAT APPELLANT NEVER
CHOKED THE VICTIM AND THAT APPELLANT AND VICTIM WERE NOT
FIGHTING - CONTRARY TO THE PRESENTED EVIDENCE - IS GROUNDS FOR
A NEW TRIAL
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court has discretion in determining whether to grant or deny a motion for a new
trial, and we will not reverse a trial court's decision absent clear abuse of that discretion. State
v. Wetzel. 868 P.2d 64, 70 (Utah 1993); State v. Thomas. 830 P.2d 243, 245 (Utah 1992).
ISSUE I
WHETHER THE EVDJENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE VERDICT
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing a jury's verdict based on a claim of insufficient evidence, we owe "broad
deference to the fact finder, [and our] power to review a jury verdict challenged on grounds
of insufficient evidence is limited." State v. Souza. 846 P.2d 1313, 1322 (Utah Ct. App.
1993). We review the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence in
the light most favorable to the jury's verdict and reverse only if that evidence is so
"'inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which [he] was convicted.'" IdL
at 1322 (citation omitted). Further, in reviewing defendant's claim, we will not "weigh
conflicting evidence, nor substitute [our] judgment on the credibility of the witnesses for that
of the jury." State v. Wright 893 P.2d 1113, 1117 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Rather, "[i]n a jury
5

trial, 'the jury serves as the exclusive judge of both the credibility of witnesses and the weight
to be given particular evidence."' State v. Baker. 348 Utah Adv. Rep. 30, 34 (Utah Ct. App.
1998) (quoting State v. Workman. 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993)).
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VI.
STATEMENT OF GROUNDS FOR SEEKING REVIEW OF ISSUE NOT
PRESERVED IN TRIAL COURT
All issues presented have been preserved in trial court or in subsequent motions with
the trial court.
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VII.
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Amendment VI of the U.S. Constitution
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of counsel for his defence.
Article I, section 10 of the Utah Constitution
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In capital cases
the jury shall consist of twelve persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury
shall consist of no fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature
shall establish the number of jurors by statute, but in no even shall a jury
consist of fewer than four person. In criminal cases the verdict shall be
unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury
in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded.
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend
in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his behalf, to be confronted by
the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the
attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have
been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees
to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against
her husband, or a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put
in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause
exist unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in
whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause
8

or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 704(b).
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition
of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to
whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition
constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such
ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone.
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(m)
After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be informed on any
point of law arising in the cause, they shall inform the officer in charge of
them, who shall communicate such request to the court. The court may then
direct that the jury be brought before the court where, in the presence of the
defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to the inquiry or advise the
jury that no further instructions shall be given. Such response shall be
recorded. The court may in its discretion respond to the inquiry in writing
without having the jury brought before the court, in which case the inquiry and
the response thereto shall be entered in the record.
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 21(b).
The verdict shall be unanimous. It shall be returned by the jury to the judge in
open court and in the presence of the defendant and counsel. If the defendant
voluntarily absents himself, the verdict may be received in his absence.
Utah Code Ann. Section 77-17-13
(1) (a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify in
a felony case at trial or any hearing, excluding a preliminary hearing held
pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the party
intending to call the expert shall give notice to the opposing party as soon as
practicable but not less than 30 days before trial or ten days before the hearing.
(b) Notice shall include the name and address of the expert, the experts
curriculum vitae, and one of the following:
(i) a copy of the expert's report, if one exists; or
(ii) a written explanation of the expert's proposed testimony sufficient to give
the opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the testimony; and
(iii) a notice that the expert is available to cooperatively consult with the
opposing party on reasonable notice.
(c) The party intending to call the expert is responsible for any fee charged by
9

the expert for the consultation.
(2) If an expert's anticipated testimony will be based in whole or part on the
results of any tests or other specialized data, the party intending to call the
witness shall provide to the opposing party the information upon request.
(3) As soon as practicable after receipt of the expert's report or the information
concerning the expert's proposed testimony, the party receiving notice shall
provide to the other party notice of witnesses whom the party anticipates
calling to rebut the expert's testimony, including the information required
under Subsection (l)(b).
(4) (a) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to substantially comply with the
requirements of this section, the opposing party shall, if necessary to prevent
substantial prejudice, be entitled to a continuance of the trial or hearing
sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony.
(b) If the courtfindsthat the failure to comply with this section is the result of
bad faith on the part of any party or attorney, the court shall impose appropriate
sanctions. The remedy of exclusion of the expert's testimony will only apply if
the courtfindsthat a party deliberately violated the provisions of this section.
(5) (a) For purposes of this section, testimony of an expert at a preliminary
hearing held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
constitutes notice of the expert, the expert's qualifications, and a report of the
expert's proposed trial testimony as to the subject matter testified to by the
expert at the preliminary hearing.
(b) Upon request, the party who called the expert at the preliminary hearing
shall provide the opposing party with a copy of the expert's curriculum vitae
as soon as practicable prior to trial or any hearing at which the expert may be
called as an expert witness.
(6) This section does not apply to the use of an expert who is an employee of
the state or its political subdivisions, so long as the opposing party is on
reasonable notice through general discovery that the expert may be called as
a witness at trial, and the witness is made available to cooperatively consult
with the opposing party upon reasonable notice.
Utah Code Ann. Section 77-32-2
Utah Code Ann. Section 77-35-17(m)

10

VIII.
STATEMENT OF CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings and Disposition at Trial Court
This is an appealfroma final judgment of the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Sheila McCleve presiding.
The victim was shot on February 9, 2001. The Appellant was bound over on
November 28, 2001 and a preliminary hearing was held at that time. He was arraigned on
December 10, 2001, where he pled not guilty. A Motion to Quash bindover was held on
January 18, 2002, which motion was denied. A pretrial conference was held on April 15,
2002. The jury trial was held from April 23 to April 25, 2002. A sentencing hearing was
held on June 17,2002 and continued to September 5,2002 and again to September 16,2002.
A motion for a new trial was filed on September 26, 2002 and was denied on October 22,
2002. The notice of appeal was filed on November 4,2002.
The Appellant was ultimately convicted of Murder, a first degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (2001).
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IX.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Between April 23 and April 25, 2002, a jury trial was held in the matter of the State
of Utah versus Trent Ray Tucker("Tucker"), the Appellant. Tucker was charged with
Criminal Homicide Murder - a First Degree Felony. TT p. 10. After the jury was seated,
given instructions and recessed for lunch, counsel for the defendant, Ralph Dellpiana
("Dellpiana") was given an opportunity to discuss defendant's Motion in Limine specifically, that Dr. Leis ("Leis"), medical examiner, be limited to testifying about the cause
of death, but not the manner of death. TT p.22. The court ruled that Leis would be permitted
to testify as to his opinion on the cause and manner of death based on "the reports of police
officers and others as he compiles and examines the physical evidence and makes those
observations." TT p.22. He added that Leis could testify based on "whatever the
investigators said to him at the scene..." TT p.23.
Dellpiana then mentioned that the defense had reached an agreement with the State,
represented by Kelly R. Sheffield ("Sheffield") that the testimony of Nick Roberts
("Roberts"), a "last-minute expert" TT p.25. ". .. would be limited to the description of the
physical operation of the gun at issue." TT p.25. Dellpiana said that "[this type of gun as
[sic] a single-action gun that requires two steps to fire. And I have agreed in advance that,
so long as his testimony is just about that, that we won't object based on notice, the notice
requirements, and would allow him to go ahead and testify on that subject." TT p.25. The

12

court asked Sheffield if he would limit his testimony simply to the operation of the gun, to
which Sheffield replied "Correct." TT p.25. The court, to reaffirm, said, "And we're not
going to go beyond that scope." Sheffield replied "Correct." TTp.26. Notwithstanding the
agreement by the State, when Roberts was called to testify, and was asked, "If there were two
people basically playing tug of war with the gun[,]" he responded, "If two people were
playing tug of war with this gun that I checked, this gun would still have to have its trigger
pulled to have been fired. And there would be burning of somebody. Somebody would be
burned." TT p. 159. Dellpiana objected and requested that the comment about burning be
stricken as being beyond the scope of the notice. While the jury was recessed, Dellpiana
expressed concern at length to the court about the testimony being beyond the scope of the
notice. TT pp. 166-170. The court agreed to strike the comment that someone would be
burned. But Dellpiana rightly observed that by the court pointing out the objectionable
statement, it "rings the bell again" in the minds of the jurors. TT p. 169.
The State's first witness was Jeremy Ray Kettler ("Kettler"), a roommate of the
Appellant and the victim, among others. TT p.36. Kettler stated that on February 9th there
were approximately three visitors to the house. TT. p.41 whom Kettler later admitted were
of the nature of thugs or gangsters. TT.p72. At one point, immediately after one of the
visitors got done talking on the house telephone, he punched the wall and threw the phone.
The visitor then began hitting one of the residents of the house named Ron. TT p.43. While
the visitor was hitting and kicking Ron, the Appellant came into the room and pulled the
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assailant off Ron. TT p.46. The assailant and another visitor named "Magic" turned on
Appellant Tucker and began striking him. TT p.46. The fight then ended and two of the
visitors left the house. TT p.45.
Shortly after thatfight,the visitor named "Magic" began arguing with Tucker. They
then began fighting, and Kettler noticed a gun. TT p.49. It fell on the floor and Magic
picked it up and hit Tucker "six or seven times with it." TT p.50. So Kettler kicked Magic
and the gun came free. TT p.50. When Kettler picked up the gun he could not tell if it was
cocked. TT p.52. After the altercation, and Magic had collected his things and stepped
outside, Tucker asked Kettler for the gun. TT p.54. So Kettler gave it to him. TT p.55.
Tucker left the room and, after a period of time passed, Kettler heard a loud noise. TT p.55.
Kettler went to his dad's bedroom, tried to open the door, found resistance, and just pushed
his way in. TTp.56. He found Tucker in the room and the victim lying still on the floor. TT
p.56.
Once Kettler got into the bedroom, he noticed blood comingfromthe victim's head.
He asked Tucker "What'd you do?" Tucker responded by saying "I didn't mean to. She
made me do it; I didn't mean to." TT p.60. Kettler then hit the wall and then hit Tucker in
the face, TT p.61-62, knocking him out. Kettler left the room, had someone call an
ambulance, and then went outside. TT p.63-64. Kettler saw Tucker one more time on the
balcony and then didn't see him again that night. TT p.64. Kettler testified that during the
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party, there was drinking going on. TT p.65. Sheffield then asked Kettler if there was any
drug paraphernalia around the house, to which he replied there was not. TT p.66.
After a short recess, Sheffield resumed questioning Kettler. He asked if Kettler saw
anything in the victim's hand. Kettler said he saw a gun. TT. p.67. The handle was in her
hand, the barrel was pointed to her feet, and herfingerswere not on the trigger. TT p.68.
Kettler's observation of the Appellant's demeanor was of someone "scared, frightened,
discombobulated, disoriented." TT p.75.
Kelly Kent ("Kent"), homicide detective with Salt Lake City Police, then testified.
She was asked about her interview of Jeremy Kettler. Counsel for the Appellant then
objected,". . .for the record, to the contents of her interview with Jeremy Kettler on hearsay
grounds." TT p.80. It was during this objected to testimony that Kent stated Kettler told her
he heard the Appellant and the victim arguing the morning of the shooting and he saw the
Appellant's hands around the victim's neck. TT p.81.
Sheffield again attempted to bring up the alleged presence of drug paraphernalia in
the home by showing Kent photos. Dellpiana's objection was sustained. TT p.84. Sheffield
continued trying to bring in the photos of drug paraphernalia, allegedly located at the home,
but was denied permission by the court. TT pp.85-88. Sheffield, after numerous denials by
the court, had the officer just testify that she saw drug paraphernalia in the home. TT p. 89.
Sheffield examined Detective Kelly Kent about efforts to locate the Appellant, Tucker.
He asked Kent details about locating the Appellant, including asking the question, "Do you
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know how he was apprehended in Colorado?" TT p. 130. It was not until cross examination
by Dellpiana that the jury would learn that Tucker was not, in fact, "apprehended" but rather
gave himself up. TT p. 131.
Dr. Edward M. Leis ("Leis") testified, describing his responsibilities as a medical
examiner as investigating " . . . all deaths that are due to violence, deaths that are suspicious,
deaths related to drugs, some deaths that occur in hospitals, and a few other types." TT
p. 171. He is also required to, in homicide cases, collect evidence, document injuries, and
testify in court. TT p. 171. Leis did not describe his duties as involving any type of
psychological or psychiatric work, nor did his description of his training involve such.
Dellpiana objected to Leis' being qualified to testify as to the manner, but not cause of death.
His objection was overruled. TT p. 173.
After describing the trajectory of the bullet into the head of the victim, Leis described
two light red bands on the victim's neck which he interpreted as strangulation marks. TT
p. 179. Leis also noted petechiae inside the eyelids and inside of her mouth, TT p. 181 and
a small bruise to the inside of the right breast and on one shin. TT. p. 181-182. Counsel for
Appellant later drew from Leis that he had previously testified in the Preliminary Hearing
that Leis did not observe any ecchymosis, or bruising, in the neck, and that the petechiae he
observed could conceivably have been caused by the gunshot wound. TT pp. 187-188
Leis " . . . certified the immediate cause of death in this individual as a gunshot wound
to the head." TT p. 184. He testified that he is required to not only certify the cause of death
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but also " . . . a manner of death, which is a statistical classification." TT p. 184. Leis
classified this as a homicide, which, for the medical examiner's office purposes, " . . . is
defined as a deliberate act of one individual leading to the death of another individual." TT
p. 184.
During cross-examination, the following dialogue took place:
Dellpiana : In regards to your testimony about the manner of death, I think you said
that you classified the manner of death as a homicide. Right?
Leis: That's correct.
Q:

One of the alternative choices is accident. Right?

A:

It can be, yes.

Q:

All right. Now, isn't it fair to say that for you to classify a gunshot wound as

an accident requires, by your definition, that a gun be defective. Is that correct?
A:

It would have to be faulty in some capacity, yes.

Q:

All right. So in a situation where, for example, somebody was unaware of a

gun being loaded and it was loaded and they pulled the trigger and it fired and it hit
somebody off somewhere and they die, you would not classify that as an accident, would
you?
A:

No.

Q:

Even though you would agree that the person wasn't intending, under those

circumstances - -
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Sheffield:

Objection, your Honor

The Court:

Sustain the objection.

Dellpiana:

Judge, I think it's important that the jury understand what is meant by

"accident."
The Court:

Approach side bar.

(a side-bar conference was held)
Dellpiana:

Just for the record, you - - well, never mind that. I think you already

stated that adequately.
Okay. So you've identified a cause of death and a manner of death. Let
me ask you one more question about the manner of death. It's correct, is it not, you would
agree that you don't use intent in making your determinations about manner of death?
A:

Correct. Intent is for the judge and the jury to decide in a particular case.

Q:

So you'd agree that a gunshot wound that you classified for your purposes as

a homicide could be fired under extreme emotional distress?
Sheffield:

Objection, your Honor

The Court:

Sustained.

Dellpiana:

Judge, this is important that the jury understand that his - -

The Court:

Approach the bench again.

(A side-bar conference was held)
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Dellpiana:

You have testified, Dr. Leis, that you classified this as a deliberate

homicide; is that correct?
A:

As a homicide.

Q:

Oh, okay. But because you don't use intent in making your determinations,

you're not trying to speculate as to the state of mind of the person who may have been
involved in firing that shot. Correct?
A:

Correct.

Q:

A person, under what you're talking about when you call it a homicide, would

not exclude somebody acting under extreme emotional stress. Correct?
A:

It wouldn't necessarily.

Q.

And because you're not using intent in making your determinations, it wouldn't

specifically include somebody acting with criminal negligence. Correct?
Sheffield:

And I am going to object to that, your Honor.

Dellpiana:

Well -

Sheffield:

The first question was fine.

Dellpiana:

I'm sorry for interrupting. Maybe we need to approach again.

Sheffield:

I think he has now movedfromthat first question we agreed to -

The Court:

Come to side bar.

(A side-bar conference was held.)
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Dellpiana:

One last question about this different question. In any case, Dr. Leis,

your - the statements that you've made about the manner of death, based on your physical
analysis and the conclusions that you've testified to, you would agree that the manner of
death could be - in this case could have been caused under the circumstances that a judge
and jury could find to be accidental.
A:

As I stated earlier, I mean I'm charged with classifying this death as to the

manner of death, which I did as homicide. It's up to the legal system to define what level of
charge, if any, should be leveled because of this particular act. I mean, I don't grade - 1 don't
put "Homicide, Grade 1" "Homicide, Grade 2." I call it "homicide," and then the legal
system is charged with the duty of putting a degree or level to it.
Q:

Is that a yes?

I mean, you'd acknowledge that, depending on the

circumstances, that that would be a question for the judge and jury?
Sheffield:

Your Honor, he has asked his question and its been answered.

The Court:

Overruled. You canfinishthat.

Dellpiana:

I was finished.

Q (by Dellpiana):

I am saying for clarification - I'm only saying this because your

answer went on for a little while. You would agree that it's up to the jury to decide a
question such as that, such as whether a shooting was accidental or not. Did I understand
your answer?
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A:

It would be up to a jury to decide whether they feel there was any intent and

what degree of intent.
Dellpiana: Thank you, Judge. That's all I have for Dr. Leis. TT pp. 189-193
After Sheffield's redirect examination determined from Leis that CPR can also result
in the Petechiae seen on the victim's body, he asked about abnormalities on the victim's
fingers, hands or arm area and the exact proximity of the gun to her skin? An objection by
Dellpiana was sustained on both questions as being beyond the scope.

TT p. 195.

Dellpiana's recross established that Leis did not know if CPR had been administered. TT
pp. 195-196.
After the jury recessed for lunch, the court explained to Dellpiana that the reasoning
behind its continued refusal to allow Dellpiana to cross examine the medical examiner
regarding his opinion about negligence on the part of Tucker, was that it was " . . . call[ing]
for a legal conclusion on the doctor's behalf, having found that he could testify as to manner
of death. TT p. 199 The court said, "But with respect to any kind of speculation or conclusion
that was a legal one, I overruled your objection." TT p. 199.
Dellpiana:

Then I think there was a sustained objection to the criminal negligence.

The Court:

Right.

Dellpiana:

- concept

The Court:

On the theory that it was a legal conclusion that you were calling for.
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Dellpiana:

Which is, again, part of the grounds for why I was objecting to him

making a conclusion that this was a deliberate homicide. TT p.200
A motion was then made by Dellpiana to dismiss the case, which motion was denied
by the court. TT pp.202-203.
Dr. Robert K. Rothfeder ("Rothfeder") testified for the defense. After being qualified
as a medical expert, he stated that the physical finding regarding the marks on the victims
neck was rather minor, not specific to anything in particular and has no relationship at all to
the victim's cause of death. TT pp.206-207. He said that the petechiae could have been
caused by the gunshot wound, TT p.209, and that being struck in the head repeatedly could
result in acute brain dysfunction. TT p.210. He also stated that "manner of death" is a legal
concept containing five categories - suicide, accident, homicide, natural causes and
undetermined. TT. p.212. Of those, he stated that natural causes was the only one that
could be excluded as a manner of death, and that "undetermined" is the most proper
determination. TTp.213.
Tommy Ray Tucker, the Appellant's father, testified that when he came into the
bedroom and saw the victim on the floor, he began pushing on the victim's solar plexus to
keep her heart going. TT p.225.
Tommy Tucker's testimony was followed by Appellant Trent Tucker's testimony.
Tucker described the commotion involving the strangers in his house and the fight resulting
in him getting hit in the face with the gun. TT p.233. He regained possession of the gun but
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could not recall if he cocked the revolver at that time. TT p.235. He said he then went with
the victim into the bedroom and asked her what the deal was with her friends. He said that
if Magic, the assailant, was still out there, he was going to go take care of it. TT p.235. He
said he then went for the door, the victim grabbed the gun saying "No!", and the gun went
off. TTp.236
Tucker testified about the fight he and the victim had earlier in the day and about the
events immediately following the shooting. TT pp.237-239. He said he finally turned
himself in because he had to resolve it. TT p.240.

X.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A

WHETHER THE MEDICAL EXAMINER'S TESTIMONY THAT THE
MANNER OF DEATH WAS "HOMICIDE" BY "DELIBERATE ACT"
WAS AN IMPROPER COMMENT THAT USURPED THE JURY'S
FUNCTION TO DETERMINE, INTENT IN VIOLATION OF RULE 704
OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
During the jury trial, the medical examiner was called by the State to testify. His role

was ostensibly to explain to the jury his observations of the victim in his capacity as an expert
medical examiner. He explained that the cause of death was as a result of a bullet penetrating
the head of the victim. His testimony, however, exceeded his area of expertise when he made
the legal conclusion that the victim's manner of death was homicide caused by a deliberate
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act. The medical examiner was at no time qualified to testify as an expert as to the state of
mind of the accused. His testimony prejudiced the jury and is reversible error.
B.

WHETHER THE MEDICAL EXAMINER'S TESTIMONY THAT THE
MANNER OF DEATH WAS "HOMICIDE" BY "DELIBERATE ACT"
WAS IMPROPERLY BASED ON INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY
EVIDENCE
The Utah Supreme Court has held that medical examiners may not rely on hearsay

statements from other witnesses in determining manner of death; thus testimony that is based
on such hearsay should be excluded. State v. Oniskor, 510 P.2d 929 (Utah 1973) (finding
that it was error to allow State medical examiner to base his opinion about manner of death
on hearsay information.) The medical examiner, called as an expert witness by the State to
testify as to the cause of death, also testified as to the manner of death by utilizing
information from reports and comments of police officers and the opinions of citizens, none
of whom were witnesses of the actual shooting. The officers who provided the medical
examiner input were either first responders or otherwise conveyed their opinions to the
medical examiner at the beginning of the investigation. Allowance of the medical examiner's
legal conclusion that the event was a deliberate act is a reversible error.

C.

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW COUNSEL FOR
DEFENDANT TO CROSS EXAMINE THE MEDICAL EXAMINER ABOUT
WHETHER HIS OPINION THAT A "HOMICIDE" WAS COMMITTED BY
"DELIBERATE ACT" EXCLUDED NEGLIGENT ACTS AND VIOLATED
DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS TO CONFRONT WITNESSES AND PRESENT A
DEFENSE
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Counsel for Appellant cross-examined the medical examiner, Dr. Leis after Leis had
come to the legal conclusion the death was homicide (based on hearsay evidence).
Appellant's only recourse to counter that harmful and improper testimony, was to rigorously
cross-examine Leis as to why another conclusion - an accidental shooting - was not as
feasible as his erroneous conclusion of homicide. Each attempt by counsel to mitigate and
weaken Leis assertion was immediately disabled. The Constitutional right to confront this
witness by conducting probing cross-examination was denied to the Appellant.
D

WHETHER THE DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE
PRESENT DURING THE RULING ON A QUESTION BY THE JURY
DURING DELIBERATIONS WAS VIOLATED WHEN THE COURT
ANSWERED A QUESTION BY THE JURY WITHOUT THE
DEFENDANT'S PRESENCE
Relying on the Utah Constitution, statutes, and prior decisions, the Utah Supreme

Court has ruled that "any communication between judge and jury should be in the presence
of the accused, his [or her] counsel and the prosecutor." State v. Lee. 585 P.2d 58 (Utah
1978). In the case at bar, Defendant was not present during the discussion regarding the jury
question. Lee plainly prohibits the trial judge from communicating with the jury in this
manner. 585 P.2d at 58. Thus, Defendant's constitutional right to due process was denied.
Moreover, the discussion regarding the jury question was apparently not captured in the
record of the trial. See TT at 307 (there is nothing in the record between the jury being given
the case and the jury's verdict.).
E

WHETHER IT WAS PLAIN ERROR FOR THE COURT TO GIVE
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 19, WHICH ERRONEOUSLY STATES THE
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CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH A JURY MAY CONSIDER A
LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE
In all criminal cases the defendant has a right to a unanimous verdict. Utah Const.
Art. I section 10; Utah R. Crim. Pro. 21(b). In addition, a defendant has the right to present
a defense, and to have the jury consider appropriate instructions on lesser-included offenses.
State v. Piansiaksone. 954 P. 2d 861, 870 (Utah 1998). Instruction no. 19 improperly
required the jury to "unanimously agree that the evidence has failed to establish any of the
elements of Murder" before they could consider the lesser-included offense of Negligent
Homicide. The incorrect instruction prohibited the juryfromconsidering the lesser offense
even if several of the jurors believed Murder had not been proven. Thus, Defendant's
constitutional right to a fair jury trial and to present a defense were foreclosed by Instruction
No. 19.
F

WHETHER THE PROSECUTOR IMPROPERLY ELICITED
INADMISSIBLE EXPERT EVIDENCE ABOUT THE LACK OF BURN
MARKS ON THE HANDS OF THE DECEASED
The State called a gun expert to testify without having given the required statutory

notice. The witness was going to testify about how the suspect gun worked mechanically and
how discharging gases may cause burn marks on the skin of anyone within a certain range
of the gun itself. The defense theory was that the gun accidently fired when the victim was
trying keep the Appellant from harming the gangsters in the other room. The prosecution,
without providing the defense timely notice to prepare, had the gun expert testify that there
were no bum marks on the hands or arms of the victim, hence she was not trying to pull the
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gun away from the Ap? ^llant. Had Appellant been noticed within the statutory mandated
time that this witness was going to testify, Appellant would have secured the services of an
expert witness to counter that testimony and provide additional information to the jury to give
the jury a balanced understanding of the facts. Instead, the Appellant was placed at a serious
strategic disadvantage by the State.
Appellant and the State came to an agreement, however, that Appellant would not
continue the trial date not seek an expert in exchange for the State agreeing that the scope
of their expert's testimony would be limited to the mechanical operation of the gun and
nothing else. Notwithstanding the agreement, the prosecutor still elicited testimony outside
the scope of the agreement. The witness then concluded his testimony byflagrantlyviolating
the agreement.
G

WHETHER "CURATIVE INSTRUCTIONS" GIVEN BY THE TRIAL
JUDGE WAS ADEQUATE TO AMELIORATE THE CONTINUED
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Subsequent to the testimony described in Issue F above, the court attempted to lessen

the impact of the violative testimony by the gun expert by issuing an instruction to the jury
to strike the expert's last comments. The jury, of course, had heard the damaging testimony,
and no reason was given for the instruction or how the jury was expected to disregard the
testimony. Because it was such damaging testimony, the instruction to strike the testimony
was inadequate to mitigate its impact. Without testimonyfroman opposing expert, the jury
was left to weigh that information as much as other, acceptable testimony.
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H

WHETHER THE NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE THAT
APPELLANT NEVER CHOKED THE VICTIM AND THAT
APPELLANT AND VICTIM WERE NOT FIGHTING - CONTRARY
TO THE PRESENTED EVIDENCE - IS GROUNDS FOR A NEW
TRIAL
In the case at bar, Detective Kelly Kent gave objected-to hearsay testimony that

Jeremy Kettler told him during an interview, that several hours before the victim's death, he
saw Trent Tucker choking and arguing with the victim. This testimony was in sharp conflict
with Defendant's testimony that on that morning he pushed the victim out of the bedroom
he was then sharing with his girlfriend when she would not leave. He did not choke her and
did not argue with her. Kettler, though a witness in the trial for Appellant, did not confirm
said testimony. An affidavit provided by another a woman who was an eyewitness to the
incident states that Appellant did not choke the victim and, rather, Appellant and the victim
were drinking together, apparently happily.

This new evidence not only contradicts

Detective Kent's information, but alters significantly the dynamics of the prosecution's case.
I

WHETHER THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE
VERDICT
Even without the defense presented by counsel for Appellant, the evidence provided

to the jury was inadequate to convict Appellant beyond a reasonable doubt. The following
are the witnesses called by the prosecution, and a summary of the testimony that was most
damaging to the Appellant:
•

Jeremy Ray Kettler: Kettler observed the assault on the Appellant by the

gangster visitors preceding the shooting. He testified the gun was cocked when Appellant
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had it, though he was not sure if he (Kettler) had cocked it. Kettler found the Appellant in
the room with the victim and heard Appellant say "I didn't mean to. She made me do it; I
didn't mean to."
•

Kelly Kent: Kent provided hearsay testimony about an alleged fight between

Appellant and victim several hours before the shooting; discussed completely irrelevant but
inflammatory information about drug paraphernalia begin in the house, and was prodded to
testify that Appellant ultimately turned himself in.
•

Jason Snow: Took photos of the scene and talked about the gun he found.

•

Gary Trost: First officer at the scene. Provided no testimony of critical

importance either way.
•

Karen Elliott: Fingerprint technician who was unable to detect any fingerprints

on the gun.
•

Nicolas J. Roberts: Described the mechanics of the gun and gave improper

testimony.
•

Dr. Edward A. Leis: Provided physiological information about the effect the

bullet had on the victim and properly concluded and testified she diedfromthe bullet wound.
Testimony about the cause of marks on victim's neck was later contradicted by expert
testimony and affidavit from an eyewitness. He also provided unsupported and improper
conclusory explanation about manner of victim's death.
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XL
ARGUMENT
A

WHETHER THE MEDICAL EXAMINER'S TESTIMONY THAT THE
MANNER OF DEATH WAS "HOMICIDE" BY "DELIBERATE ACT"
WAS AN IMPROPER COMMENT THAT USURPED THE JURY'S
FUNCTION TO DETERMINE, INTENT IN VIOLATION OF RULE 704
OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
The Utah Rules of Evidence prohibits expert witnesses from stating an opinion or

even making an inference as to whether a defendant had a mental state constituting an
element of the crime charged. Utah R. Evid. 704(b).
Rule 704(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence specifically reads:
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition
of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to
whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition
constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such
ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone.
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 704(b) (Amended effective October 1, 1992).
In the case at bar, however, Dr. Leis was allowed to testify that the manner of death
was "homicide" and that it occurred by a "deliberate act." TT at 184. Lest the State assert
that "deliberate" action does not imply "intentional" action as the element of intent is phrased
in the murder statute at issue, the following definition of "deliberate" is provided.
Deliberate, adj. Well advised; carefully considered; not sudden or rash;
circumspect; slow in determining. Willful rather than merely intentional.
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Formed, arrived at, or determined upon as a result of careful thought and
weighing of considerations, as a deliberate judgment or plan. Carried on
coolly and steadily, especially according to a preconceived design; given to
weighing facts and arguments with a view to a choice or decision; careful in
considering the consequences of a step; slow in action; unhurried;
characterized by reflection; dispassionate; not rash.
By the use of this word, in describing a crime, the idea is conveyed that the
perpetrator weights the motives for the act and its consequences, the nature of
the crime, or other things connected with his intentions, with a view to a
decision thereon; that he carefully considers all these, and that the act is not
suddenly committed. It implies that the perpetrator must be capable of the
exercise of such mental powers as are called into use by deliberation and the
and weighing of motives and consequences.
BLACK'S DICTIONARY, p. 426 (6th ed. 1990)(internal citations omitted)
"Although Rule 704 abolishes the per se rule against testimony regarding ultimate
issues of fact, it does not allow all opinions. Nor is the rule intended to allow a witness to
give legal conclusions." Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied,
826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). And "[e]ven though testimony in the form of an opinion or
inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to
be decided by the trier of fact, it is clear that questions that would merely allow the witness
to tell the jury what result to reach are not permitted, nor is the rule intended to allow a
witness to give legal conclusions." State v. Tennev, 913 P.2d 750 (Utah Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 923 P.2d 693 (Utah 1996). Case law throughout the country delineates the propriety
of expert testimony by psychiatrists and psychologists.
There is authority.. . that it is beyond the competence of a psychiatric expert
to express an opinion as to whether the defendant factually, at the time of the
offense, acted with the requisite specific intent, the courts reasoning that such
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an opinion is not based on the expert's scientific expertise and improperly
invades the province of the jury.
16 ALR 4th 666,670 Expert Testimony - Criminal Intent.
Homicide cases wherein the expert psychiatric or psychological testimony relating to
the defendant's capacity to entertain the requisite specific intent necessary for conviction was
inadmissible for the purpose of showing that the defendant was incapable of acting, or did
not act, with the requisite specific intent include examples such as Dawson v. State. 439 P.2d
472 (Nev. 1968) (The determination of the degree of a crime, based on the state of mind of
the accused, was within the province of the jury. The expert was not capable of giving the
jury any information they did not possess from facts in evidence.), and Steele v. State. 294
NW2d 2 (Wis. 1980) (Proffered testimony of a psychiatrist, a psychiatric social worker, and
a psychologist that the defendant lacked a capacity to form an intent to kill was properly
excluded by the trial court), and State v. Donahue. 109 A.2d 364 (Conn. 1954) cert, denied
and app. dismissed 349 U.S. 926,99 L.Ed. 1257,75 S.Ct. 775 (questions of factual intent of
the defendant to kill his victim were outside the scope of expert testimony). See also State
v. Narten. 407 P.2d 81 (Ariz. 1965) cert, denied 384 U.S. 1008, 16 L.Ed. 2d 1021, 86 S.Ct
1985, Ezzell v. State. 88 So.2d 280 (1956 Fla.), People v. Jenko. 102 NE2d 783 (111. 1951),
State v.Fov. 582 P.2d 281, later app. 607 P.2d 481 (Kan. 1978), State v. Marshall. 282 SE2d
422 (NC 1981), State v. Heard. 184 NW2d 156 (Wis. 1971), State v. Smith. 564 P.2d 1194
(Wyo. 1977).
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Leis was qualified by the court only to testify as an expert medical examiner. At no
time was there a suggestion by prosecutors he would testify in any other capacity, much less
as a psychiatric expert qualified to divine intent on the part of the defendant. Further, when
Leis testified, no foundation was laid for him to speak as a psychiatric or psychological
expert. Yet by not just classifying the victim's death as a homicide out of some bureaucratic
necessity, but following that up with testimony that the victim could have died no other way
except by Appellant's intentional desire for her death extinguished any necessity for the jury
other than to rubber stamp his decision.
Dr. Leis' opinion usurped the function of the jury,. Such testimony has been found
to be reversible error. State v. VaiL 51 P.3d 1285 (Utah 2001) (jury verdict reversed where
the prosecutor elicited improper testimony from an expert concerning the truthfulness of a
sexual assault victim). Such testimony is particularly prejudicial where an expert is testifying
because of the tendency of jurors to simply adopt the judge of experts. See State v.
Rimmasch. 775 P.2d 388, 396 (Utah 1989).
B

WHETHER THE MEDICAL EXAMINER'S TESTIMONY THAT THE
MANNER OF DEATH WAS "HOMICIDE" BY "DELIBERATE ACT"
WAS IMPROPERLY BASED ON INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY
EVIDENCE.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that medical examiners may not rely on hearsay

statementsfromother witnesses in determining manner of death; thus testimony that is based
on such hearsay should be excluded. State v. Oniskon 510 P.2d 929 (Utah 1973) (finding
that it was error to allow State medical examiner to base his opinion about manner of death
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on hearsay information.) In Oniskor, the defendant was convicted for rape, murder and
robbery. The trial court admitted, over defendant's objection, the State medical examiner's
opinion that cause of death was manual suffocation. Id at 931-32. The defense objected on
the grounds that the medical examiner's opinion was admittedly based on a hearsay statement
from a police officer that the defendant had confessed to suffocating the victim with a pillow.
Id. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court found the trial court's ruling to be in error because
the medical examiner's opinion was based on hearsay. Id at 932. The court cited as
precedent State v. Hadlev. 65 Utah 109,234 P.2d 940 (1925) and quoted:
So that while we have seen, the opinion of experts may in some cases
be based upon personal knowledge gained from their own observation or
examination, they cannot give in evidence opinions based upon information
gainedfromthe statements of others outside the courtroom, since in such case
the opinions would depend upon hearsay.
Oniksor, 510 P.2d at 932, quoting Hadley. 65 Utah at 116 (emphasis added).
In the case at bar, Dr. Leis admitted that his opinion the decedent was shot by another
person was based, in part, on statements by others:
By Mr. Dellapiana:
Q:

Doctor, isn't it true that in doing your examination, as part of your
opinion as to the manner of death, are based in part on a history, any
history that you can getfromwitnesses?

A:

Uhm, well before I start the examination I have an investigative report which
is prepared by one of the investigators in our office to review. I had also gone
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to the scene of the death the day before and had some discussions with
homicide investigators at the scene. Detective Kellie Kent was also at the
autopsy and brought in some additional verbal information when she was
there.
Q:

All right. And just for purposes of this voir dire, your honor, is it correct of me
to say that in that, either in that investigative report, in your discussions with
homicide investigators, and/or with Kellie Kent, that you were advised that
there was a male, adult suspect believed to be involved in the shooting?

A:

Yes

Mr. Dellpiana:
All right. And so while, I don't' think there's any doubt or any reason to
question your opinion as to cause of death being a gunshot wound, judge, to
the extent that the opinion is based on, as we now know from hearsay sources
as to the cause of death being a third person, I would object on hearsay
grounds to that portion of the opinion being entered as evidence at this time.
The Court:
Doctor, maybe you could just state for the record what the basis of your
opinion that it was a third party actor that caused the shooting or that fired the
gun. What is the basis of your opinion in that regard?
The Witness:
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It's based not only on investigative information but also the physical
findings of the body. Although, the gunshot wound is a close contact, meaning
the gun was pressed right up against the face when it wasfired,you know, it
comes down to one other person, or was this a self-inflicted injury.
Number one, with the number of gunshot wound cases that I have been
involved with, and suicides, for women to commit suicide with handguns is
rare. They usually do other means, more commonly, drug overdose. That's
not to say we do not see deaths with gunshot wounds.
If women tend to shoot themselves to commit suicide, more commonly
the entrance wounds are located on the chest. And that's most common.
The next most common location is on the head. And if gunshot wounds
occur to the head they are usually to the temple areas or the weapon is placed
in the mouth. It's extremely rare that a weapon is placed up against the eye
and discharged as a means to commit suicide. So Ifindthat strongly in favor
of the fact this is not a suicidal act.
Plus, given the additional information that there were comments made,
there was an argument heard between another individual and the victim prior
to the gunshot being heard, and that she had sustained other injuries, to me,
indicates that a homicidal act took place and not a suicide.
The Court:
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Is it common for forensic examiners to rely upon those investigative sources
in formulating their opinion?
The Witness:
We have to because the autopsy by itself, just simply the examination of the
body, does not always tell you everything that happened.
The Court:
All right. I'm going tofindthat there is an adequate foundation for the entire
opinion so the entire opinion will be admitted in evidence for purposes of
preliminary hearings.
Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, pp. 29-32 (emphasis added)
The testimony the jury heardfromthis expert was the legal conclusion that the manner
of death of the victim was by "homicide." The foundation of the admission, in the trial, of
the medical examiner's expert opinion (based on hearsay evidence) was, of course, laid in
the preliminary hearing. The pertinent preliminary hearing transcript of the expert's voir dire
is copied above. A close analysis of that dialogue between counsel, the witness and the court
will reveal that only two factors were discussed -first,that based on the medical examiner's
personal, first person, expert observations, suicide was not involved. And second, based
solely on second-hand information (see emphasized portions of the transcript above), the
medical examiner concluded that a homicide was committed. Independent of those baseless,
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outside opinions that a homicide took place, the only legal conclusion the medical examiner
should have articulated was that the manner of death was unknown.

C.

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW COUNSEL FOR
DEFENDANT TO CROSS EXAMINE THE MEDICAL EXAMINER ABOUT
WHETHER HIS OPINION THAT A "HOMICIDE" WAS COMMITTED BY
"DELIBERATE ACT" EXCLUDED NEGLIGENT ACTS AND VIOLATED
DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS TO CONFRONT WITNESSES AND PRESENT A
DEFENSE
Defendants have a constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses

against them. U.S. Const. Amend. VI. Normally, the right to confront one's accusers is
satisfied if defense counsel receives wide latitude at trial to question witnesses. Pennsylvania
v. Ritchie, 107 S.Ct 989, 480 U.S. 39, 94 L.Ed.2d 40. In the case at bar, counsel for
Defendant was denied not only wide latitude, but not allowed any latitude in cross-examining
Dr. Leis about whether his opinion excluded the possibility of a negligent act. TT at 191,
199.
The following cross-examination took place between counsel for Appellant, Mr.
Dellpiana and the medical examiner, Dr. Leis, with objections by Mr. Sheffield representing
the State, and sustained by the court.
Q:

All right. So in a situation where, for example, somebody was unaware

of a gun being loaded and it was loaded and they pulled the trigger and it fired
and it hit somebody off somewhere and they die, you would not classify that
as an accident, would you?
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A:

No.

Q:

Even though you would agree that the person wasn't intending, under

those circumstances - Sheffield:

Objection, your Honor

The Court:

Sustain the objection.

Dellpiana:

Just for the record, you - - well, never mind that. I think you

already stated that adequately.
Okay. So you've identified a cause of death and a manner of death. Let me
ask you one more question about the manner of death. It's correct, is it not,
you would agree that you don't use intent in making your determinations about
manner of death?
A:

Correct. Intent is for the judge and the jury to decide in a particular
case.

Q:

So you'd agree that a gunshot wound that you classified for your

purposes as a homicide could be fired under extreme emotional distress?
Sheffield:

Objection, your Honor

The Court:

Sustained.
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Q.

And because you're not using intent in making your determinations, it

wouldn't specifically include somebody acting with criminal negligence.
Correct?
Sheffield:

And I am going to object to that, your Honor.

Dellpiana:

Well -

Sheffield:

Thefirstquestion was fine.

Dellpiana:

I'm sorry for interrupting. Maybe we need to approach again.

Sheffield:

I think he has now movedfromthat first question we agreed to.

The Appellant's entire defense rested on the theory that the bullet that killed the
victim was accidently fired by gun as the victim was trying to keep the Appellant from
returning to the room where he was previouslyfightingwith gangster-type visitors. Counsel
for the Appellant, however, was not permitted to ask the medical examiner anything that
suggested that the accident-theory carried as much weight as the medical examiner's legal
conclusion of "homicide."
This error was particularly prejudicial because, as noted previously, Dr. Leis was
allowed to opine that death was caused by a "deliberate" act by Mr. Tucker. Being unable
to cross-examine on this point precluded the defense from mitigating the prejudice inherent
in Dr. Leis' testimony. Thus, Defendant's constitutional right was denied and prejudice
ensued. A constitutional right should be deemed to be an "impropriety which had a
substantial adverse effect" on Mr. Tucker's right to a fair trial. Utah R.Crim.Proc. 24(a).
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Moreover, violation of a Defendant's constitutional right requires reversal for a new trial
unless the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Chavez, 41 P.3d 1137
(Utah App. 2002). (reversing a jury verdict where the defendant was not allowed to full
cross-examine a key prosecution witness on bias issues).
D

WHETHER THE DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE
PRESENT DURING THE RULING ON A QUESTION BY THE JURY
DURING DELIBERATIONS WAS VIOLATED WHEN THE COURT
ANSWERED A QUESTION BY THE JURY WITHOUT THE
DEFENDANT'S PRESENCE
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution establishes a right for criminal

defendants "to appear and defend in person." This right extends to the trial judge's
consideration ofjury questions sent to the judge during deliberations. State v. Lee. 585 P.2d
58 (Utah 1978). Relying on the Utah Constitution, statutes, and prior decisions, the Utah
Supreme Court has ruled that "any communication between judge and jury should be in the
presence of the accused, his [or her] counsel and the prosecutor." Id.
Although the statute at issue in Lee was amended and then codified in the Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure, the present rule is similar, and no case law has ever eliminated a
defendant's constitutional right to appear in court during judge and jury communications.
Following Lee, the legislature amended the statute addressing jury questions sent to judges
during deliberations. The former statute had required the trial judge to bring the jury into the
courtroom and address the question "in the presence of, or after notice to, the prosecuting
attorney and the defendant or his counsel." Utah Code Ann. Section 77-32-2 (1976).
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Two years after Lee was decided, the legislature amended the Code of Criminal
Procedure and altered the statute addressing jury questions:
After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be
informed on any point of law arising in the cause, they shall
inform the officer in charge of them, who shall communicate
such request to the court. The court may then direct that the jury
be brought before the court where, in the presence of the
defendant and both counsel the court shall respond to the
inquiry or advise the jury that no further instructions shall be
given. Such response shall be recorded. The court may in its
discretion respond to the inquiry in writing without having the
jury brought before the court, in which case the inquiry and the
response thereto shall be entered in the record.
Utah Code Arm. Section 77-35-17(m)( 1982) (emphasis added). In 1989 the legislature
repealed the Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Utah Supreme Court adopted them as court
rules. Utah Code Ann. Chapter 77-35 (Supp. 1990). The Supreme Court designated the
statute quoted above as Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(m).
In the case at bar, Defendant was not present during the discussion regarding the jury
question. Lee plainly prohibits the trial judge from communicating with the jury in this
manner. 585 P.2d at 58. Thus, Defendant's constitutional right to due process was denied.
Moreover, the discussion regarding the jury question was apparently not captured in the
record of the trial. See TT at 307 (there is nothing in the record between the jury being given
the case and the jury's verdict.).
E

WHETHER IT WAS PLAIN ERROR FOR THE COURT TO GIVE
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 19, WHICH ERRONEOUSLY STATES THE
CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH A JURY MAY CONSIDER A
LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE
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In all criminal cases the defendant has a right to a unanimous verdict. Utah Const.
Art. I section 10; Utah R. Crim. Pro. 21(b). In addition, a defendant has the right to present
a defense, and to have the jury consider appropriate instructions on lesser-included offenses.
State v. Piansiaksone. 954 P. 2d 861, 870 (Utah 1998). An instruction about the order of
deliberations when considering whether the charged offense or a lesser offense applies must
not impede a jury's opportunity to consider the defendant's lesser included offenses. Id. At
870
In Piansiaksone. a murder case, the trial court instructed the jury that "Before you can
convict of manslaughter you must have found that the evidence fails to establish one or more
of the elements of murder" beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 870. The trial court found that
the instruction was improper because they did not allow the jury to consider the lesser
included offense of manslaughter. Id The right to lesser-included offense instructions "is
more than just a procedural nicety; it is rooted in [a] defendant's constitutional right to a jury
trial." State v. Standiford. 769 P.2d 254,266 (Utah 1998). The court believed that "[Jjurors
should not be precludedfromdetermining how criminal conduct should be characterized and
judged." Id at 267.
Instruction no. 19 in the case at bar is similar to that in Piansiaksone because it
improperly intrudes on the jury's opportunity to consider a lesser-included offense.
Instruction no. 19 improperly required the jury to "unanimously agree that the evidence has
failed to establish any of the elements of Murder" before they could consider the lesser-
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included offense of Negligent Homicide. See Addendum A. A proper instruction would
have directed the jurors that they could consider the lesser-included offense if they did not
unanimously agree that all the elements of murder were met. Thus, the proper instruction
would have allowed the jury to consider the lesser offense even if only one of the jurors did
not find the offense of Murder proved. The incorrect instruction prohibited the jury to
consider the lesser offense even if seven of the jurors believed Murder had not been proven.
Thus, Defendant's constitutional right to a fair jury trial and to present a defense were
foreclosed by Instruction No. 19. The violation of a Defendant's constitutional right requires
reversal for a new trial unless the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v.
Chavez 41 P.3d 1137 (Utah App. 2002). Appellant in the case at bar moved for a new trial
on the basis that, among other things, Instruction number 19 was erroneous. Appellant's
motion was denied.
F

WHETHER THE PROSECUTOR IMPROPERLY ELICITED
INADMISSIBLE EXPERT EVIDENCE ABOUT THE LACK OF BURN
MARKS ON THE HANDS OF THE DECEASED
Nicolas Roberts was an expert witness called by the State without having given the

required statutory notice. See Utah Code Ann. Section 77-17-13 (requiring 30 days notice
of an expert's testimony); State v. Tolano. 29 P.3d 1 (Utah 2001) (reversing jury verdict for
violation of Rule 77-17-13). Mr. Roberts was called by the State purportedly to testify as a
gun expert. Roberts was thus a "surprise" witness creating an unfair advantage for the
prosecution.
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Counsel for the defense, Dellpiana, discussed the matter with counsel for the State,
Sheffield, and negotiated a compromise by which Dellpiana would not ask for a continuance,
and, in exchange, Sheffield would agree to limit the witness's testimony to a description of
the physical mechanism of a single-action revolver. See 150-51 158 (discussing stipulation).
Mr. Roberts did testify about the mechanism of a single action revolver (i.e.., that the
hammer must be pulled back before it can be fired). See Trial Transcript (TT) at 148-49.
But later, Roberts also began talking about a test he conducted on a revolver similar to the
gun in evidence in the case at bar, concerning its "flash" pattern. TT at 150. Counsel for the
defense objected that the test result was beyond the agreed scope of the witness's testimony.
TT at 150-159. Prior to trial counsel for the defense agreed that Mr. Roberts could testify
about the fact that the gun at issue in the case at bar is a single-action revolver that has to be
cocked to be fired. TT at 168. In addition, counsel for the State specifically proffered to
counsel for the defense a proposed exhibit showing a "flash test" that is, a document
exhibiting the pattern that would be made by a similar gun when it was fired. This flash test
was specifically described as being beyond the scope of the agreed testimony, given the lack
of expert testimony. TT at 168-69. The court agreed that the testimony was inadmissible and
sustained the defense's objection to the testimony. TT at 151, 168.
Counsel for the State nevertheless intentionally elicited this excluded testimony at
trial. Specifically, the State elicited evidence that because of the characteristics of the
weapon'sflashpattern, someone holding the weapon by some means other than by the handle

45

(such as during a "tug-of-war" over the weapon) "would be burned." TT at 159. The State
disingenuously attempted to describe the testimony as being part of the "physics" of the gun's
operation that could be described as falling under the "mechanics" of the gun's operation.
TTatl68.
The argument was disingenuous because prior to trial both counsel sat in the
conference and discussed the admissibility of theflashtest. The following is an excerpt from
the trial:
Prior to trial we sat back in the conference room and Kelly [one of the
prosecutors] showed me this flash test. And I said, "What's that?" He says,
"Well, Nick Roberts did aflashtest with the gun and we want to show that as
part of the evidence." And I'm saying [to Kelly], "that's way beyond what I
understood our agreement to be about how you shoot a single-action revolver."
"And for them to come in and say that they thought that was going to
be okay isn't correct."
TT at 168-69. In addition, an objection by the defense to a discussion about the
"flash" had already been sustained. TT at 151.
The test about whether prosecutorial misconduct is prejudicial is whether the
prosecutor "call[ed] to the attention of the jurors matters which they would not be justified
in considering in determining their verdict, and were they, under the circumstances of the
particular case, probably influenced by those remarks." State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483,486-87
(Utah 1984) (reversing a jury verdict where the prosecutor remarked about matters outside
the evidence and there was not compelling proof of defendant's guilt).
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The State's actions constitute misconduct because the prosecutor knew that the
evidence about the "flash test was beyond the scope of the agreement with counsel for the
defense. TT at 151, 168-69. The court so found as well by sustaining a defense objection
about the "flash", TT at 151, and about someone being burned by the flash. TT at 169.
Furthermore, the State's intentional misconduct was prejudicial because the jury
considered the evidence concerning the lack of bums on the hands of the victim. See
Affidavit of Tawni Hanseen, Addendum B (indicating that the jury talked about how there
should have been bum marks on the hands of the victim if she were pulling on the gun, and
there were not). Moreover, the remarks by the gun expert can. also be seen to be prejudicial
because they are not merely extraneous or irrelevant, but because they go directly to the
primary defense that the shooting was accidental. The defense claimed the victim pulled on
the barrel of the gun to try to try take it from Mr. Tucker so that he would not go after her
friends who had just been assaulted by beating him on the head and face with the butt of the
gun. TT at 289-90. Given the lack of compelling direct evidence of guilt, it is easy to see
how the jury was "probably influenced by those remarks." Troy 688 P.2d at 486-87.
Accordingly, the State's misconduct should be found to be an "impropriety which had a
substantial adverse effect" on Mr. Tucker's right to a fair trial. Utah R. Crim. Pro. 24(a).
G

WHETHER "CURATIVE INSTRUCTIONS" GIVEN BY THE TRIAL
JUDGE WAS ADEQUATE TO AMELIORATE THE CONTINUED
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
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Though the trial court admonished the jury to disregard the mention of lack of burn
marks on the victim, the devastation wrought by that statement was far too damaging to be
ameliorated by a simple instruction to disregard it. TT p. 170. The statement about the lack
of burn marks by the gun expert about flash coming out the front and the side of the gun, TT
p. 150-151, gases going out of the gun, TT p. 156-157, and finally, that "there would be
burning of somebody. Somebody would be burned" TT p. 159 resounded in the juror's
minds. This was no ordinary testimony - it was an expert witness telling the jury that the
Appellant was guilty since an accident, as a matter of scientific certainty could not have
occurred. No curative admonition or instruction could diminish the impact of that testimony.
Whether intentional or not, the prosecution elicited testimony from its expert witness that
was contrary to the proffers made prior to trial and even during the trial; and, despite the
efforts of the court to cure the effect of the elicited testimony, the damage was done, and
seeds of prejudice against the Appellant were planted in the minds of the jury.
While the court often stressed to the jury the importance of keeping an open mind and
to listen to all the evidence before arriving at a conclusion about the case, it failed to
specifically address the nature of curative instructions at any time during its proceedings in
advance of the instruction actually given in response to the Appellant's objection. TT. p. 170.
This omission prevented the jury from being forewarned both before and after his testimony
to disregard the prejudicial comments of the gun expert.1 Therefore, the court's statement
1

See State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262.273. n.8. In that case, the trial court gave not only
a strong curative admonition but also a preliminary instruction at the beginning of trial warning
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"Just before the recess the Court took under advisement a response by Deputy
Roberts. And the portion about that response that was volunteered that
indicated somebody would have been burned will be stricken from the record
and the jury will disregard that portion. I believe it was something to the effect
that somebody would be burned."
The statement was inadequate at considering the magnitude of the damage done.
In State v. Harmon. 956 P.2d 262, 273 (Utah 1998), this Court acknowledged that
curative instructions are not necessarily a '^cure-all" and that some errors may be too
prejudicial for curative instructions to mitigate their effect, and a new trial may be the only
proper remedy.

See also, State v. Wetzel 868 P.2d at 69 (Utah 1993) ("[C]urative

instructions are not always sufficient to avoid the potential prejudice to the Appellant."; see
also. State v. Auble. 754 P.2d 935,937 (Utahl 988) (stating that limiting instructions may not
be sufficiently effective to prevent jury from considering evidence which is unfairly
prejudicial to Appellant). It should be noted that the curative instruction given in Harmon
was much more complete, forceful and instructive than any given in the instant case;
furthermore, in Harmon the court asked the jury members if they had any questions, which
was not done in the instant case. Cf. R. 331 and 956 P.2d at 270-271.

jurors that testimony or exhibits would be offered which would be deemed inadmissable, and
that the jury should treat such matters as if they had never heard them.
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Additionally, in Harmon. Justice Durham provided an opinion2 as to the efficacy of
curative jury instructions. She set forth some of the ideas of J. Alexander Tanford from his
article entitled "The Law and Psychology of Jury Instructions," 69 Neb.L.Rev.71 (1990)
(containing extensive discussion of empirical research and proposing solutions to the
problem of ineffective curative instructions). Professor Tanford suggests, among other
things, that. . . (2) trial judges instruct jurors at the beginning of trial that they will be
required to disregard evidence which is successfully objected to and that any reference to an
Appellant's criminal record may not be considered as evidence of guilt (this because
psychological research demonstrates that forewarning about prejudicial information can
reduce susceptibility to it). While Professor Tanford's suggestions are not controlling, a
simple understanding of human nature compels reasonable minds to entertain the notion that
curative instructions are more often than not ineffective, especially where, as in the instant
case, the improper testimony is so authoritative, relevant and devastating to the defendant's
case.
This Court further stated in Harmon that it must use the standard set forth in Greer v.
Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 767 n.8, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 3109 n.8, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987), to review
curative instructions on appeal to ensure that the Appellant received a fair trial. 956 P.2d at

2

It should be noted that Harmon appears to be a plurality opinion - Russon, J., wrote the
principal opinion in which only Howe, J., fully concurred (only two of thefivejustices).
Stewart, j . , concurred in the result without comment. Durham, however, who also concurred in
the result, wrote a separate opinion in which Zimmerman, J., concurred. Thus, as many justices
concurred with Durham's separate opinion as with Russon's opinion.
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273. See also, United States v. Humphrey, 34 F.3d 551, 556-7 (7th Cir. 1994) (cited in
Harmon at 272.) In Greer the United States Supreme Court stated, "[W]e normally presume
that a jury will follow an instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence inadvertently
presented to it, unless there is an 'overwhelming probability' that the jury will be unable to
follow the court's instructions, and a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence would
be 'devastating' to the Appellant."
The standard in Greer involves two prongs - that of 'overwhelming probability' that
the jury will be unable to abide by the court's instructions and that the evidence supposedly
cured by an instruction is 'devastating.' In the instant case, despite the efforts of the
Appellant prior to trial to prevent the adverse testimonyfromcoming out, the very testimony
the Appellant sought to preclude did come out: and, although the court sought to mitigate the
effect of that testimony by means of curative instructions, the instructions failed to cure the
devastating effect of the testimony.
To put the testimony in perspective, here you have a very authoritative and
experienced expert witness on the stand, who testifies about the mechanics of the gun used
in the shooting, and then goes on to blurt out that "if two people were playing tug-of-war
with this gun that I checked, this gun would still have to have its trigger pulled to have been
fired. And there would be a burning of somebody. Somebody would be burned." TT p. 159.
The jury could not ignore the weight of such testimony, even when instructed by the court
to disregard it. So the prejudicial testimony elicited by the prosecution at once devastated
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the defense's strategy and pushed the jury toward a verdict that resulted in Appellant's
incarceration.
Furthering the argument of the questionable efficacy of curative instructions, in State
v. WetzeL 868 P.2d 64, 69 (Utah 1993), this court held that in relation to curative
instructions and their efficacy, "The potential for prejudice is greatest when the
circumstantial facts are closely related to the issue the jury must ultimately decide. When,
as here, the improper purpose for which the jury might consider the evidence bears closely
on the central question - Appellant's guilt or innocence - the utility of curative instructions
becomes doubtful." (Where victim's state of mind was not in issue, but Appellant's state of
mind could have been, per the curative instruction, the utility of the curative instruction was
deemed doubtful).
The State could perhaps respond with the cynical argument that under Rule 16(g) of
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, if the court learns a party has failed to comply with
discovery rules, the court may order a continuance to alleviate the problem. Of course when
the Appellant and Appellee agreed before trial that Appellant would not seek a continuance
if Appellee would avoid discussing certain issues, Appellant assumed the Appellee would
comport itself according to the agreement. If any time was the best time to request a
continuance in this trial, it was prior to arguing the case before the jury. Once testimony
began, however, Appellee decided to flagrantly violate the agreement, and a continuance
would only delay the inevitable. A continuance would, in fact, have only highlighted to an
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even greater degree the violative testimony of the gun expert. Counsel for Appellant faced
a conundrum created by the State.
H

WHETHER THE NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE THAT
APPELLANT NEVER CHOKED THE VICTIM AND THAT
APPELLANT AND VICTIM WERE NOT FIGHTING - CONTRARY
TO THE PRESENTED EVIDENCE - IS GROUNDS FOR A NEW
TRIAL
It is a long-established rule that new evidence calling a verdict into question can be

grounds for a new trial. State v. Halford. 17 Utah 475, 54 P. 819 (1898) (holding that
defendant convicted of rape was entitled to a new trial on the basis of newly discovered
evidence and affidavits from which it appeared that defendant was surprised at testimony of
the prosecutrix and that much of material testimony given by her at trial was untrue); State
v. Campbell 25 Utah 342,17 P. 529 (1903) (new trial granted where testimony of defendant
convicted of manslaughter was in sharp conflict with testimony of other primary witness and
new affidavits strongly tended to corroborate defendant).
In the case at bar, Detective Kelly Kent gave objected-to hearsay testimony about
Jeremy Kettler, telling him during an interview that in the morning, several hours before the
victim's death, he saw Trent Tucker choking and arguing with the victim. This testimony
was in sharp conflict with Defendant's testimony that on that morning he pushed the victim
out of the bedroom he was then sharing with his girlfriend when she would not leave, but that
he did not choke her and did not argue with her.
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New evidence from Barbara Penman indicates that this testimony about an argument
was erroneous See Affidavit of Barbara Penman, Addendum C. Ms. Penman indicates in
her affidavit that the victim told her that Mr. Tucker did not choke her. She also states that
the day the victim died, she saw the victim and she had no marks on her neck at that time and
that she and Mr. Tucker were drinking together, apparently happily.
Given the lack of competent evidence that Defendant was guilty of murder, this
important new information should be found to be grounds for a new trial.
I.

WHETHER THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE
VERDICT
The evidence as presented by the Plaintiff/Appellee to support their allegations was

inadequate to sustain the verdict. Jeremy Kettler's testimony described a party in which
Appellant Tucker was assaulted by several gang-type individuals. He obtained a pistol to
defend himself and his home, but was beat about the face by a "guest" using the pistol.
Tucker, who by now was dazedfrombeing beat about the head, had every reason to use the
weapon on the "guests" but absolutely none to use it on the victim. Kettler testified the gun
may have been cocked when he had it and it was taken by Appellant. TT p.52. When Kettler
heard the gunshot and found Appellant with the victim, he heard the Appellant blurt out: "I
didn't mean to. She made me do it; I didn't mean to." TT p.60. To Kettler, the Appellant
looked "scared,frightened,discombobulated, disoriented." TT p.75. Said statements and
demeanor are those of any person who would have experienced the trauma of such an
episode.
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Detective Kelly Kent then provided objected-to hearsay testimony for the prosecution
about an argument she said Jeremy Kettler told her about between the appellant and the
victim - an argument Kettler himself did not describe during his testimony.

Newly

discovered evidence, in fact flatly contradicts the Kent testimony. Barbara Penman, in fact,
signed and swore in an affidavit that her recollection of the morning of the shooting was that
the Appellant and the victim did not argue. Kent also mentioned drug paraphernalia at the
scene. TT p.83. Kent also described how the Appellant was "apprehended" in Colorado TT
p. 130, although it was later established that the Appellant actually turned himself in. TT
p. 131. Kent's testimony does not provide evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the
Appellant murdered the victim.
Detective Jason Snow testified about photographs he took while processing the scene
of the accidental shooting, TT pp.91-92, and about the gun he found at the scene, TT p. 127,
but did not provide any evidence against the Appellant.
Officer Gary Trost testified as the first officer at the scene of the incident. He never
saw the Appellant. TT p.97. He had nothing to offer as evidence against the Appellant.
Karen Elliott, the fingerprint technician for the Utah Bureau of Forensic Services,
testified only that she found no fingerprints on the suspect gun. TT pp. 138-140.
Nicolas John Roberts ("Roberts"), the gun expert from the Salt Lake County Sheriffs
Office, testified primarily to the mechanics of the gun. He was the witness whose testimony
violated the agreement between counsel for Appellant and the State. Were his testimony
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restricted to that agreed upon by the parties, the jury could only have considered the
mechanical operation of the suspect pistol (1 e trigger pull, safety operation, single-action
versus double-action, etc ) Instead, he also provided the very prejudicial information about
the effect of the gases escaping from the chamber of the gun on firing - information the
defense was unprepared to counter with its own expert testimony because prosecutor's
deceit He stated "If two people were playing tug-of-war with this gun that I checked, this
gun would still have to have its trigger pulled to have been fired And there would be burning
of somebody Somebody would be burned " TT p 159 The implication, of course, was that
somebody was not burned - information Roberts was not qualified to state Asidefromthat
prejudicial and extremely improper testimony, nothing Roberts testified to provided evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant murdered the victim
Dr Edward A Leis' testimony would not prove evidence of murder (as opposed to
accident) except for the conclusory legal determination he was allowed to give the jury that
the death was a "homicide" by "deliberate act" All of his testimony regarding the victim,
the trajectory of the bullet, and other testimony, would have supported the defense theory of
death by accidental shooting

Even his testimony about the marks on the neck of the

deceased is not evidence supporting murder beyond a reasonable doubt The Appellant's
contention is further strengthened by the counter-testimony by Dr Rothfeder and the
evidence that Jeremy Kettler's interview with Detective Kent about an alleged argument
between the Appellant and the victim was false
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XII.
CONCLUSION AND SIGNATURE OF COUNSEL OF RECORD
In light of the above arguments, Appellant seeks reversal and remand of the abovecaptioned case.
DATED this o ?

day of _

-£*.

2003.

UAjt

"^T/^2 fit/L &&7V*
rney for Appellant
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XIII.
PROOF OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Brief of Trent
Tucker was either hand-delivered or mailed by United States mail, postage prepaid, this 2nd
day of June, 2003 to the following:
Michael D. Andruzzi, #7804
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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XIV.
ADDENDUM
Jury Instruction Ns 19

Addendum "A'

Affidavit of Tawni Hanseen

Addendum "B

Affidavit of Barbara Penman

Addendum "C
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ADDENDUM "A"

INSTRUCTION NO.
The

following

is

a

suggested

deliberation uo guide you m

tut

nou

required

order

of

considering your verdict options.

First, you should determine whether or not the evidence has
established the crime of Murder.

If you unanimously find that:

all the elements of Murder, have been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt,

you

Murder.
caused

not

immediately

convict

the

defendant

of

Instead, you should consider whecher the defendant also
the

disturbance
excuse.
that

should

If

the

extreme

death
for

under

which

emotional

influence

there

the evidence
defendant

the

is

a

of

extreme

reasonable

emotional

explanation

establishes beyond a reasonable

caused

the

disturbance

death

under

for which

the

there

or

doubt

influence

of

is a reasonable

explanation or excuse, then you must find that the defendant is
guilty of Manslaughter and not of Murder.
On

the

other

hand,

if

you

unanimously

agree

that

the

evidence has failed to establish any of the elements of Murder,
beyond

a

defendant
agree

reasonable

you

should

ccnsider

is guilcy of Negligent Homicide.

thai:

Negligent

doubt,

the

evidence

Homicide,

Negligent Homicide

you

establish
must

Ko^e\ras,

find

whecher

the

If you unanimously

all

of

the

the

defendant

elements

of

guilcy

of

if you unanimously agree t.iac the

evidence has fa-lea to establish am' of the elements of

INSTRUCTION NO.
Page 2

Negligent Homicide, beyond a reasonable doubt, you must: find the
defendant not guilty.

ADDENDUM "B"

RALPH DELLAPIANA (6861)
TAWNI HANSEEN (#7871)
Attorneys for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

:

AFFIDAVIT OF
TAWNI HANSEEN

:

vs.
TRENT RAY TUCKER,

:

Case No. 011902328
JUDGE SHEILA MCCLEVE

Defendant.

I, Tawni Hanseen, do hereby swear that the following statements are true and are made of
my own free will and that no one has coerced me or made any promises to me in exchange for my
statement.
1.

On or about June 6,2002,1 had a telephone conversation with Kurt Patterson, a juror
in the above entitled action.

2.

During that conversation I asked Mr. Patterson about how the jury reached it's
conclusion of guilt.

2.

Mr. Patterson told me that the jury did not rely on any single piece of evidence.

3.

However, he stated that the jury found it significant that there were no burns on the
victim's hands.

4.

This was evidence that the Court specifically instructed the jury not to consider.

DATED this 7f)

day ofW/Dl

_, 2002.

U mu*
TAWNI HANSEEN

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this ,- : -'5~ day of^b^O^
DEBBIE GAFFNEY
Notary Public
State of Utah
Mv Comm. Expires Jul 3,
406 v

^ r , ,-vcS -crtanUT

.#«--—

My Commission Expires:

M.
NOTARYPUBLIC I \)
Residing in:

, 2002.

ADDENDUM "C"

AFFIDAVIT
I, BARBARA PENMAN, of 6895 West 3830 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, swear that
the following facts are true and correct to the best of my recollection:
On or about February 9, 2001, I was present at 2620 South Windsor Circle, in Salt
Lake City at the time that Phyllis Coreen Lenear died from a gunshot wound. Also present
was Jeremy Kettler.
Earlier that day, I saw Trent Tucker and Ms. Lenear drinking together.

They

appeared to be happy. Because Mr. Kettler told me that he saw Mr. Tucker and Ms.
Lenear arguing earlier that day, and that he thought he saw Mr. Tucker choke Ms. Lenear,
I asked Ms. Lenear what happened. She made it clear to me that Mr. Tucker never put his
hands around her neck nor did he choke her. She said he did pull her hair but that she
egged him on by calling him a pussy. Ms. Lenear had no marks on her neck. I don't think
Trent hated her and I know he did not purposely kill her. So, Mr. Kettler was lying if he said
anything different.
DATED this

\V

day of September, 2002.

p>/\hkir<GL 4£?Ah\a/
BARBARA PENMAN

'

STATE OF UTAH )
)ss.

County of Salt Lake)

\l
On thic
this \LP
day of September, 2002, personally appeared before me BARBARA
PENMAN, to me known to be the person whose name is subscribed to the foregoing
instrument, who duly acknowledge to melhat she executed the sarnie.
f

M/,'J

—Notary Publ^
My Commis

(LWMjfr^

